Filip Lubinski

Extended abstract of my coming Competition Law 2.0: Forging A New Paradigm in a Crisis-Driven World (Cambridge/UCL) conference presentation:

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5245211

Is economics a science?

At the beginning of the millennium, the European Commission announced the “More Economic Approach” (MEA) to competition law as a shift from “a legalistic-based approach to an interpretation of the rules based on sound economic principles.” Terms that reappeared in this reform process, such as “sound” and “principles,” suggested attributing scientific status to economics. The need for a shift to science was argued in various ways. The discretion of authorities and the strategic nature of competition law create a high risk of political factors influencing legal proceedings. Focusing on economics was intended to help reach unbiased, evidence-based, and just decisions, optimizing consumer welfare. Economics promised to provide theories and tools that would lead lawyers to better decisions. These expectations and contrasting economics to the free interpretation of legal rules that may be susceptible to bias further exemplify the scientific status attributed to economics. Contrary to what the word “more” in MEA might suggest, it was not about a quantitative increase in the amount of economics in law enforcement but rather about ensuring the quality of its application, its fitness for the intended purpose, and adherence to analytical discipline. MEA was not about granting economics the privileges of science that were previously denied to it. The point was instead to establish a standard for a thorough, case-by-case test of whether the authority claimed by this discipline is supported by respecting the duties of science, which is its necessary condition. MEA was not that much about further acknowledging the possibilities of economic analysis as of its limits.